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LEARNING AND MONETARY POLICY
Issue one: core versus headline inﬂation.
The role for learning: ﬁltering.
Issue two: systemic risk.
The role for learning: information revelation.
Issue three: optimal policy in an economy with
non-fundamental equilibria.
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WHY THESE THREE ISSUES?
Provide some focus.
Timely in current monetary policy discussions.
Each has a distinct conventional wisdom behind it.
The conventional wisdom is probably wrong.
But the conventional wisdom is driving policy.
Welfare consequences in principle could be large.
An opening for good research to impact economic
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A CORE ISSUE
The idea that oil prices are critical to understanding U.S.
and possibly G-7 business cycles has wide appeal.
Hamilton (1983); subsequent revamping.
The ad hoc approach since the 70s has been to ignore
energy price movements and focus on "core" inﬂation.
In the past I would have agreed that this practice has
served us well.
Now I think the tide has turned and we need to think
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BLINDER’S DEFENSE OF CORE
Buiter’s paper at Jackson Hole 2008 included criticism of
“core inﬂation.”
Alan Blinder offered a defense.
U.S. monetary policy cannot have a meaningful impact on
global oil markets.
If oil price movements are mainly noise then it shouldn’t
matter.
A one-time shift in the level of oil prices should not have a
big impact.
A longer term trend in energy prices would be more
problematic.
But, a “theorem” says that energy prices cannot continue to
increase faster than other prices forever.
This is the conventional wisdom echoed at the FOMC.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
BLINDER’S DEFENSE OF CORE
Buiter’s paper at Jackson Hole 2008 included criticism of
“core inﬂation.”
Alan Blinder offered a defense.
U.S. monetary policy cannot have a meaningful impact on
global oil markets.
If oil price movements are mainly noise then it shouldn’t
matter.
A one-time shift in the level of oil prices should not have a
big impact.
A longer term trend in energy prices would be more
problematic.
But, a “theorem” says that energy prices cannot continue to
increase faster than other prices forever.
This is the conventional wisdom echoed at the FOMC.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
BLINDER’S DEFENSE OF CORE
Buiter’s paper at Jackson Hole 2008 included criticism of
“core inﬂation.”
Alan Blinder offered a defense.
U.S. monetary policy cannot have a meaningful impact on
global oil markets.
If oil price movements are mainly noise then it shouldn’t
matter.
A one-time shift in the level of oil prices should not have a
big impact.
A longer term trend in energy prices would be more
problematic.
But, a “theorem” says that energy prices cannot continue to
increase faster than other prices forever.
This is the conventional wisdom echoed at the FOMC.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
BLINDER’S DEFENSE OF CORE
Buiter’s paper at Jackson Hole 2008 included criticism of
“core inﬂation.”
Alan Blinder offered a defense.
U.S. monetary policy cannot have a meaningful impact on
global oil markets.
If oil price movements are mainly noise then it shouldn’t
matter.
A one-time shift in the level of oil prices should not have a
big impact.
A longer term trend in energy prices would be more
problematic.
But, a “theorem” says that energy prices cannot continue to
increase faster than other prices forever.
This is the conventional wisdom echoed at the FOMC.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
BLINDER’S DEFENSE OF CORE
Buiter’s paper at Jackson Hole 2008 included criticism of
“core inﬂation.”
Alan Blinder offered a defense.
U.S. monetary policy cannot have a meaningful impact on
global oil markets.
If oil price movements are mainly noise then it shouldn’t
matter.
A one-time shift in the level of oil prices should not have a
big impact.
A longer term trend in energy prices would be more
problematic.
But, a “theorem” says that energy prices cannot continue to
increase faster than other prices forever.
This is the conventional wisdom echoed at the FOMC.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
BLINDER’S DEFENSE OF CORE
Buiter’s paper at Jackson Hole 2008 included criticism of
“core inﬂation.”
Alan Blinder offered a defense.
U.S. monetary policy cannot have a meaningful impact on
global oil markets.
If oil price movements are mainly noise then it shouldn’t
matter.
A one-time shift in the level of oil prices should not have a
big impact.
A longer term trend in energy prices would be more
problematic.
But, a “theorem” says that energy prices cannot continue to
increase faster than other prices forever.
This is the conventional wisdom echoed at the FOMC.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
BLINDER’S DEFENSE OF CORE
Buiter’s paper at Jackson Hole 2008 included criticism of
“core inﬂation.”
Alan Blinder offered a defense.
U.S. monetary policy cannot have a meaningful impact on
global oil markets.
If oil price movements are mainly noise then it shouldn’t
matter.
A one-time shift in the level of oil prices should not have a
big impact.
A longer term trend in energy prices would be more
problematic.
But, a “theorem” says that energy prices cannot continue to
increase faster than other prices forever.
This is the conventional wisdom echoed at the FOMC.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
BLINDER’S DEFENSE OF CORE
Buiter’s paper at Jackson Hole 2008 included criticism of
“core inﬂation.”
Alan Blinder offered a defense.
U.S. monetary policy cannot have a meaningful impact on
global oil markets.
If oil price movements are mainly noise then it shouldn’t
matter.
A one-time shift in the level of oil prices should not have a
big impact.
A longer term trend in energy prices would be more
problematic.
But, a “theorem” says that energy prices cannot continue to
increase faster than other prices forever.
This is the conventional wisdom echoed at the FOMC.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTSTHREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Oil price movements look more like a ﬁve-year trend.
Very plausible that this is driven by increased demand
from the developing world.
(Although, why 2003?)
Also plausible that this could go on for a long time.
Decades. Think Solow model.
The “theorem” may not have much bite.
Empirical literature: what best predicts future headline
inﬂation?
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NEEDED: SOME THEORY
I would like to see more theory-oriented approaches to the
subject, less statistics.
My sense is that theory would always put some weight on
each price.
The ad hoc aspect of the “core” idea would be removed.
Households and policymakers would solve an optimal
ﬁltering problem.
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NEEDED: SOME THEORY, CONTINUED
Households and policymakers would have to track
changing relative prices.
The equilibrium would involve ongoing learning about
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ONE THEORY
One example without any learning:
Martin Bodenstein, Chris Erceg, and Luca Guerrieri.
“Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with Distinct Core
and Headline Inﬂation Rates.” JME, forthcoming.
Retail prices are Calvo-sticky, wages are Calvo-sticky,
energy prices are ﬂexible.
This means “core prices” are sticky. This makes core
inﬂation the key to welfare maximization.
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REMARKS
A trend in the relative price of energy is not part of the
analysis.
This theory would put a lot of emphasis on “what’s
sticky?”
The view of policymakers would be, “what prices do
consumers actually face?”
“Degrees of price stickiness” would suggest optimal
ﬁltering in this setting.
Also, the ﬁnal goods price contains the weighted energy
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THE SYSTEMIC RISK STORY
Monetary policy has been heavily inﬂuenced by ideas
concerning systemic risk in the last year or so.
The basic idea is that the sudden failure of a single ﬁrm
may cause other, healthy, ﬁrms to fail at the same time.
This would damage the intermediation sector, and it
would take a long time to recover.
Macroeconomic models do not typically address this topic.
Rising or falling systemic risk is pushed into the stochastic
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A SLIPPERY CONCEPT
The systemic risk story is difﬁcult to cope with in the
policy world.
The aire of “collapse of the ﬁnancial system” is worrisome.
At the same time, all ﬁnancial ﬁrms have incentives to tell
this story when necessary in order to avoid losing money.
Many genuinely believe it.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
A SLIPPERY CONCEPT
The systemic risk story is difﬁcult to cope with in the
policy world.
The aire of “collapse of the ﬁnancial system” is worrisome.
At the same time, all ﬁnancial ﬁrms have incentives to tell
this story when necessary in order to avoid losing money.
Many genuinely believe it.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
A SLIPPERY CONCEPT
The systemic risk story is difﬁcult to cope with in the
policy world.
The aire of “collapse of the ﬁnancial system” is worrisome.
At the same time, all ﬁnancial ﬁrms have incentives to tell
this story when necessary in order to avoid losing money.
Many genuinely believe it.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
A SLIPPERY CONCEPT
The systemic risk story is difﬁcult to cope with in the
policy world.
The aire of “collapse of the ﬁnancial system” is worrisome.
At the same time, all ﬁnancial ﬁrms have incentives to tell
this story when necessary in order to avoid losing money.
Many genuinely believe it.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
HISTORY
Recent history includes large failures without large
repercussions: Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990, Barings
Bank in 1995, Long Term Capital Management in 1998,
Enron in 2001, and Amaranth Advisors in 2006.
There were periodic panics in the 19th century U.S.
between the Civil War and the founding of the Federal
Reserve.
There was an equilibrium, but policymakers and
consumers did not like that equilibrium.
Of course, there is the Great Depression.
Interested listeners might consult Gary Richardson and
William Troost, “Monetary Intervention Mitigated Banking
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MULTIPLE STEADY STATES?
Jackson Hole question: How much weight should
policymakers put on an implicit “ﬁnancial stability”
objective, relative to price stability and maximum
sustainable employment?
To this group:
This sounds like multiple steady states.
Requires a notion of what drives the dynamics around each
steady state.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
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ONE THEORY
One paper at this conference, George Evans and Seppo
Honkapohja, “Robust Learning Stability with Operational
Monetary Policy Rules,” takes steps in this direction.
Certain policy rules, if adopted, would generate an
unstable target equilibrium.
The policymaker community does not usually talk in these
terms.
No ﬁnancial intermediation component.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
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NEEDED: SOME THEORY
To get closer to the ﬁnancial instability story a theory
needs to incorporate private information held by
interlinked ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
One interpretation of ﬁnancial markets is that information
is being revealed every day.
All players understand the incentives to withhold
information.
Therefore, they are Bayesian learners with respect to the
announcements made by other ﬁrms.
They also understand the sequence of events if there is a
default.
The endogenous debt constraints literature emphasizes that
the penalty for default inﬂuences the equilibrium level of
credit.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
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EQUILIBRIUM
Would the Bayesian equilibrium somehow be “fragile”?
Would it break down in response to certain shocks and
cause Evans-Honkapohja-style instability?
My sense is no, because the players would understand the
risk of failure of a partner ﬁrm. But the conventional
wisdom is yes.
In other industries, the failure of a large rival is good for
business.
It is important that we get an idea of the fundamental
problem we are trying to address when it comes to
ﬁnancial stability.
Interested listeners might check Franklin Allen’s overview
at Jackson Hole, “Understanding Financial Crises.”THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
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ECONOMISTS VERSUS THE WORLD
I have worked a fair amount on non-fundamental
equilibria.
In the literature it has been an uphill climb.
Many economists remain skeptical of multiple equilibria.
But, to be fair, much more widely accepted today than it
once was.
In the policy and ﬁnancial markets worlds, “bubbles” are
taken as self-evident.
Story: Oil at $145 a barrel.
Market insiders told me it was wildly high and turned out
to be right.
If you think it is persistent fundamentals, you might predict
based on a random walk, otherwise you predict a crash.
What should policymakers do?THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
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CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The conventional wisdom is to ﬁrst of all admit ignorance.
Plan to react to a crash if one should occur.
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SOMETHING SENSIBLE
The theory literature has done something sensible on this
question.
It has focused on ﬁnding conditions under which
non-fundamental equilibria may exist.
The literature has then suggested policies that might
eliminate the non-fundamental equilibria.
This is reasonable, but very specialized to particular
models.
And, actual policymakers may be more circumscribed in
what can be done.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
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NEEDED: SOME THEORY
Suppose that for reasons exogenous to the model,
equilibrium is indeterminate and so susceptible to
non-fundamental shocks.
Let’s not take the route of adopting a policy to eliminate
the indeterminacy.
Instead, is there a way to respond to an observed
non-fundamental shock to improve on the equilibrium?
In principle, there may be welfare superior equilibria
available in the indeterminate region.
Commentators were talking about housing bubbles for
years before prices began falling. Similarly with recent
commodity price increases.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
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SOME COMMENTS
I have outlined some thoughts on research topics related to
learning and monetary policy.
One idea concerns ways to get rid of the ad hoc ﬁltering
done in the core inﬂation measures.
Another suggested ways to get a better handle on the
concept of systemic risk.
And a third was an appeal to provide advice from existing
models on how to react to a non-fundamental shock, if
policymakers were willing to bet that an observed price
movement was not driven by fundamentals.
All of these topics are part of the current policy debate.THREE ISSUES A CORE ISSUE SYSTEMIC RISK NON-FUNDAMENTAL EQUILIBRIA SOME COMMENTS
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